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ABSTRACT
In the fourteenth paragraph of the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism, J. S. Mill writes 
that ‘We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought 
to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of 
his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.’ 
I criticize the attempts of three commentators who have recently presented act-
utilitarian readings of Mill – Roger Crisp, David Brink, and Piers Norris Turner – to 
accommodate this passage.
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1. Introduction
The question of what moral theory John Stuart Mill holds is keenly debated. 
While I have previously made positive contributions to this debate (see espe-
cially 2010, 79–110), my present contribution will primarily be a negative one, 
since I shall offer some criticisms of the work of three interpreters who have 
recently put forward act-utilitarian readings of Mill: Roger Crisp, David Brink, and 
Piers Norris Turner. My criticisms will focus on something very specific, namely 
their attempts to make sense of one passage, paragraph fourteen of chapter 
five of Utilitarianism (which I will hereafter call V14). The relevant portions of 
this lengthy paragraph run as follows:
For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters 
not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We 
do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to 
be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of 
his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. 
This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple 
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expediency. It is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a per-
son may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted 
from a person, as one exacts a debt. … Reasons of prudence, or the interest of 
other people, may militate against actually exacting it; but the person himself, it 
is clearly understood, would not be entitled to complain. There are other things, 
on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire 
them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that 
they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame 
them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment … I 
think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the bottom of the notions of 
right and wrong; that we call any conduct wrong, or employ, instead, some other 
term of dislike or disparagement, according as we think that the person ought, 
or ought not, to be punished for it; and we say, it would be right, to do so and so, 
or merely that it would be desirable or laudable, according as we would wish to 
see the person whom it concerns, compelled, or only persuaded and exhorted, 
to act in that manner. ([1861] 1969, 246)
I will be asking two questions about the act-utilitarian readings of Mill that 
I consider: first, whether they are consistent with this passage, and, second, 
whether we can adopt them without attributing unnecessarily implausible or 
otherwise unappealing positions to Mill. In each case, I will show that one or 
both questions must be answered in the negative.
Admittedly, this might not by itself establish that the act-utilitarian reading 
of Mill must be abandoned. While Mill has much to say that bears on the choice 
between moral theories, different remarks seem to point in different directions 
and some seem to be outright contradictory. Any interpretation will therefore 
fit awkwardly with certain passages, impute a view to him that is unpalatable 
in some respect or other, or both. The best that those of us who write on his 
moral philosophy can realistically hope to accomplish is to show that our favored 
reading has fewer and smaller imperfections than the alternatives. Still, V14 
does seem to be particularly important; it appears in the essay that is generally 
regarded as our best source for understanding the mature Mill’s views on ethics, 
and the length at which he dilates on the point that he makes therein suggests 
that he considers it especially significant. Even Daniel Jacobson, who contends 
that Mill’s interpreters tend to attach far too much importance to Utilitarianism, 
takes V14 to be the key to understanding Mill’s moral philosophy.1 So if Mill’s 
act-utilitarian interpreters should prove unable to accommodate the passage 
adequately this would be a major strike against their reading, if not by itself a 
fatal flaw.
2. Lyons on V14
Before turning to Mill’s act-utilitarian interpreters, I will first say a bit about the 
work of one who rejects this way of reading Mill and does so largely on the 
strength of V14. This is David Lyons, whose influential account of what Mill is 
doing in V14 is worked out in a series of papers that began to appear in the 
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mid-1970s. I start here because Crisp, Brink, and Turner are all reacting to Lyons’s 
account, and in fact they all accept much of it.
As Lyons reads V14, Mill here presents a metaethical analysis of the concepts 
of morally wrong action and moral duty or obligation in terms of the justifia-
bility of punishment. More specifically, and more distinctively, Lyons takes Mill 
to analyze these concepts in terms of the justifiability of one particular variety 
of punishment, namely the ‘internal sanction’ that is imposed by the agent’s 
own conscience in the form of guilt; guilt is a warranted or justified response to 
immoral behavior even when the other kinds of punishment which Mill men-
tions are not.
When Mill traces a connection between ‘the idea of penal sanction’ and the con-
cept of wrong conduct, he clearly stretches the former to cover not just external 
threats and penalties of an informal, extralegal nature, but even guilt feelings 
and self-reproach … Furthermore, Mill suggests that self-reproach is not just one 
among a number of alternative forms of ‘punishment,’ the justification of which 
is connected with the idea of wrong conduct, but rather that it is the minimal, 
essential sort of ‘punishment’ so linked with the idea of immorality. Mill says that 
external sanctions may or may not be justified for wrong conduct, but that guilt 
feelings are always warranted when one acts wrongly. ([1982] 1994, 129)
In consequence, Lyons writes, ‘wrongness is conceptually connected with justi-
fied guilt feelings, but only contingently or synthetically connected with external 
sanctions’ ([1982] 1994, 130).
As I noted previously, Lyons’s reading of V14 is a crucial premise in his argu-
ment for the conclusion that Mill is something other than an act utilitarian. For 
Mill, Lyons maintains, sanctions ‘assume coercive rules’ ([1976] 1994, 55). This 
may appear to be true only of legal sanctions. However, on Lyons’s reading, Mill 
understands the conscience as an enforcer of rules; he thinks that we experience 
guilt when we have violated a rule that we have ‘internalized,’ or at least when 
we perceive ourselves to have done so. So the internal sanction presupposes 
coercive rules, too. And so do the informal social sanctions, at least insofar as 
they are expressions of blame, since typically we blame others for transgressing 
more or less the same coercive social rules that we feel guilt for breaking our-
selves. Blame and guilt do differ in an important respect, however: while we can 
choose not to act on our feelings of blame toward someone else, and so refrain 
from imposing external sanctions on her, our feelings of guilt ‘operate more or 
less automatically’ ([1976] 1994, 56). While there will be some variations between 
individuals, Lyons takes Mill to believe that by and large people who live in the 
same social milieu will internalize the same rules. So to say that an agent should 
feel guilt for a given action is to say that there should be what Lyons calls a 
‘coercive social rule’ that prohibits the action, that is, that the members of the 
agent’s society should internalize such a rule.
So far nothing about the position that Lyons is attributing to Mill is distinc-
tively utilitarian. However, on Lyons’s reading Mill applies a utilitarian criterion 
to determine what coercive rules should be current in a society. A society is 
®
 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  677
warranted in having a particular moral code, which is to say a particular set 
of coercive rules, just if this would yield more happiness than would its hav-
ing some other code instead. This is Bentham’s theory of punishment, which 
Lyons reminds is one of the parts of Bentham’s thought that Mill finds most 
satisfactory, applied to coercive social rules ([1976] 1994, 52; see [1833] 1969, 
11). For an action to be wrong, therefore, is for it to be prohibited by the moral 
code which it would be optimal for people to internalize. While guilt is the only 
form of punishment that is conceptually linked to immorality, on this reading 
of Mill, other forms of punishment – informal social sanctions or formal legal 
penalties – may also be justified for morally wrong actions. Whether they are 
will depend on whether the benefits of their employment exceed the costs. (It 
might sometimes maximize happiness for a society to pass laws that prohibit 
some type of behavior without bringing it about that its members internalize 
coercive social rules that prohibit it. In these instances, Lyons takes Mill’s view to 
be that while this behavior should be illegal, it is not immoral ([1976] 1994, 57)).
Lyons observes that ‘Mill's view resembles many modern rule-utilitarian the-
ories in that the relevant rules are (as it were) “ideal”, not actual. Mill's theory 
refers to justifiable rules, but not only to rules that are actually accepted or “in 
force”’ ([1976] 1994, 62). Still, Lyons himself refuses to call Mill a rule utilitarian.2 
Some more recent commentators who follow closely in Lyons’s wake, however, 
including Wendy Donner (2009, 33–55) and myself, have not shared his reticence 
on this point.
3. Crisp
Crisp reads Mill as an act utilitarian largely, if not solely, on the strength of the 
second paragraph of the second chapter of Utilitarianism (II2) (1997, 95–99). 
It is here that Mill famously describes utilitarianism as the creed which ‘holds 
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’ ([1861] 1969, 210). Crisp, like 
Brink and Turner, reads Mill as a ‘sophisticated’ act utilitarian, one who distin-
guishes between the theory’s moral standard and the ‘decision procedure’ that 
it tells agents to follow in deliberating about what to do. According to Crisp, Mill 
recommends that we generally follow the rules of ‘customary morality’ when 
choosing between alternative courses of action, since they are reasonably good 
guides to choosing optimal actions; indeed, ‘Crisp’s Mill’ believes that ‘custom-
ary morality is solidly grounded on the principle of utility’ (1997, 114). Nor are 
these rules to be mere rules of thumb to which no feelings are attached. These 
rules are already ‘inculcated deep within us,’ as Crisp puts it, which is to say that 
they are widely internalized in Lyons’s sense, and Crisp’s Mill regards this as 
desirable (1997, 109). (The area in which customary morality is least satisfac-
tory from an act-utilitarian standpoint may be the paucity of the sacrifices that 
it demands from us for the benefit of strangers, and Crisp suggests that Mill 
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may be downplaying the theory’s demandingness in Utilitarianism so as not to 
frighten his readers away (1997, 115)). There are two ways in which Crisp’s Mill 
believes that explicitly utilitarian reasoning should figure in our moral thinking. 
First, when the rules of customary morality conflict, as they frequently will, we 
should set them aside and try to work out which of the actions open to us 
would maximize happiness (1997, 110). Second, Mill would have us periodically 
employ utilitarian reasoning to look for ways in which customary morality could 
be improved from a utilitarian standpoint, so that we can then make strategic 
use of ‘praise and blame’ to bring it about that the next generation internalizes 
a better moral code than has ours (1997, 131). In this way customary morality 
will gradually improve.
Crisp’s Mill, then, holds a view much like that of R. M. Hare, according to which 
we should internalize rules that are distinct from the act-utilitarian injunction to 
maximize happiness but should periodically reflect ‘in a cool hour’ about how 
the rules that we have internalized might be improved (1981, 25–64). One dif-
ference is that Crisp’s Mill apparently believes that someday humanity will have 
progressed to the point at which a non-utilitarian decision procedure is largely 
obsolete; people who are sufficiently intelligent and impartial will be able to 
guide their behavior through the direct application of act-utilitarian thinking: 
‘They will have a pretty good idea of when happiness has been maximized or 
not,’ Crisp says, ‘and will no longer need much or any of customary morality, hav-
ing moved beyond it’ (1997, 131). This does not mean that they will have become 
beings of the sort whom Hare calls ‘archangels,’ able to foresee perfectly all of 
their actions’ ramifications and so invariably produce optimal consequences. 
But they will reliably act in ways that maximize expected happiness or utility, 
and hence their actions will be ‘subjectively’ if not always ‘objectively’ right from 
the act-utilitarian perspective.
When he turns his attention to V14, Crisp agrees with Lyons that in this pas-
sage Mill is ‘analysing the notion of wrongness itself’ and that on his analysis 
to call an action wrong means that it should be punished (1997, 128). Crisp 
claims that Mill would have done better to have said something quite different 
in V14, since he thinks that the analysis that the passage contains is vulnerable 
to an ‘open question’ argument, but he apparently finds the passage too clear 
to be construed differently. Crisp acknowledges that at first glance the com-
bination of this analysis with act utilitarianism appears self-contradictory. An 
action might be suboptimal, and therefore wrong in act-utilitarian terms, and 
yet the act of punishing the agent might also be suboptimal; the act utilitarian 
would therefore apparently have to say that the punishment both is and is not 
justified and that the action both is and is not wrong. But Crisp asserts that the 
automatic operation of the internal sanction saves Mill’s view from this obvious 
sort of internal inconsistency.
The principle of utility, as a practical principle, applies to human conduct. It does 
not govern consciences directly, since, unlike legal punishment or blaming others, 
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conscience is not something over which we have control. Thus there is no imag-
inable case of an agent's failing to maximize happiness to which Mill would be 
forced to retract any attribution of wrongness. (1997, 129)
Note that, unlike Lyons, Crisp does not maintain that Mill’s analysis of wrongness 
is framed specifically in terms of the internal sanction; he says only that Mill 
believes that to say that an action is morally wrong means that some punish-
ment or other is warranted for it. Guilt is simply the one form of punishment 
whose imposition does not require some ‘punisher’ to act, and so it is the one 
form of punishment that an act utilitarian can consistently say is warranted for 
every suboptimal action.
Crisp admits that Mill’s conjoining of the act-utilitarian moral standard with 
V14’s analysis of moral concepts does still have some ‘peculiar implications.’ 
These include the facts that we will never know when to feel guilty, since we 
can never be certain whether we have actually maximized happiness, and that 
we should feel guilty in cases in which we chose the action which had by far the 
highest expected happiness, even though unknown to us there was something 
we might have done instead whose actual consequences would have been 
better (1997, 130). Crisp suggests that the latter of these worries can at least be 
ameliorated if we take Mill to be thinking about subjective rather than objective 
wrongness in V14; as Crisp draws this distinction, an action is subjectively wrong 
if it fails to maximize expected happiness and objectively wrong if its actual 
consequences are suboptimal. Making this move probably does something to 
address the former worry as well.
But there is a more serious problem for Mill on Crisp’s reading whose force 
it does nothing to blunt, which is that Crisp’s attempt to free the combination 
of views that he attributes to Mill from inconsistency by appeal to the internal 
sanction fails. Recall first that as Crisp reads Mill all that it means to say that 
an action is wrong is that some punishment or other for it is justified. Crisp, I 
have already noted, does not follow Lyons in taking Mill to analyze wrongness 
specifically in terms of the internal sanction. Mill might be able to say without 
inconsistency that guilt is warranted for every suboptimal action. On Crisp’s 
interpretation, though, Mill is still committed to saying that an action is wrong 
as long as any punishment is warranted for it. So, consider a case in which an 
individual did something which maximized happiness and which the individual 
knew would maximize happiness, but for which it would now maximize hap-
piness to punish the individual via some external sanction. Jamie Lannister, let 
us say, having sworn a solemn oath to protect the reigning monarch no matter 
what, kills the mad king Aerys Targaryen to prevent him from incinerating the 
city of King’s Landing and all of its inhabitants. It may well be optimal to punish 
Jamie, at least by informal social sanctions like using the insulting nickname 
‘Kingslayer.’ This might, for instance, reinforce the social prohibitions against 
killing and oath-breaking. Punishing Jamie might still be optimal even if the 
circumstances of his act were generally known, as is not the case in the Game 
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of Thrones universe (as of this writing, anyway), since this might discourage 
people from trying to calculate for themselves whether their killing someone 
or breaking an oath would produce a positive net balance of happiness and we 
are notoriously bad at such utility calculations. But if the act-utilitarian principle 
is the appropriate standard for us to use in judging whether punishing Jamie 
is warranted, and if by this standard his punishment is warranted, then given 
the analysis in V14 we must conclude that he was wrong to kill King Aerys. This 
conclusion contradicts Mill’s putative act utilitarianism, so the view that Crisp 
assigns to Mill is still internally inconsistent.3
It might look like Crisp could easily eliminate this inconsistency with a minor 
repair to his view; all that would be needed, one might think, is for him to follow 
Lyons in saying that Mill’s analysis of wrongness in V14 is framed specifically in 
terms of the justifiability of the internal sanction. Yet the fundamental problem 
would remain. Recall that Crisp’s Mill believes that the rules we should have 
internalized are those of our society’s customary morality. Over time we can 
hope that customary morality gradually improves, but our internalization today 
of the rules that are current in our customary morality is part of what Crisp’s Mill 
believes is ‘solidly grounded’ on a utilitarian foundation. This means that we 
ought to feel guilty about violating these rules, not about failing to maximize 
happiness or expected happiness. Crisp recognizes that there is an issue here; 
another of the peculiar implications he lists of the view that he attributes to Mill 
is that when we do something wrong and feel guilty about it we will usually be 
feeling guilty for the wrong reason. Suppose I tell a lie, for example, and this fails 
to maximize happiness. For an act utilitarian it is the failure to maximize that 
is responsible for my action’s being wrong, Crisp observes, but I will feel guilty 
not about that but about lying as such.
But casting the issue in this way misstates it, or at least it distracts attention 
from a larger issue. If Crisp’s Mill analyzes what it is to call an action wrong in 
terms of the justifiability of punishing it via the internal sanction, and if he 
believes that we should be punished via the internal sanction for actions that 
violate the rules of customary morality, then he is committed to the claim that 
actions contrary to those rules are wrong. This is true even when those actions 
do maximize happiness, as actions forbidden by customary morality sometimes 
will, and again this contradicts Mill’s putative act utilitarianism. Even if Crisp’s 
Mill says that optimal actions that violate the rules of customary morality are 
only subjectively wrong, while they are still objectively right, this would still 
contradict his putative act utilitarianism since Crisp says that for an act-utilitarian 
actions are subjectively right if they maximize expected happiness. Customary 
morality will not permit every action that maximizes expected happiness.4 
Similarly, if Crisp’s Mill analyzes what it is to call an action wrong in this way and 
if he believes (as it seems clear that he does) that we should internalize only the 
rules of customary morality, then he must believe that any actions permitted 
by these rules are morally permissible. Yet our customary morality permits very 
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many actions that maximize neither actual nor expected happiness. Yet again, 
this contradicts Mill’s putative act utilitarianism, since act utilitarianism permits 
no actions that fall short of optimality.
Crisp might appeal here to his contention that Mill believes that in a genu-
inely civilized world, one that hopefully lies in our future, customary morality as 
we know it will no longer exist.5 Perhaps when he analyzes the notion of what 
it is for an action to be wrong in terms of the justifiability of punishment, Mill 
could mean that actions are wrong if they are the sort of actions for which the 
inhabitants of this genuinely civilized world would be punished by the internal 
sanction, even if in the world as it is the rules which people should feel guilty 
about violating are rather different. And perhaps in this world people would 
internalize only a single coercive social rule, namely one that requires them to 
maximize expected happiness.
I do not believe that V14 can bear this construction. Nothing in Mill’s language 
there does anything to suggest that when he says, for instance, that a person 
who acted wrongly is a ‘proper object of punishment,’ what he really means is 
that she would be a proper object of punishment in a better and hopefully future 
world in which humanity has made great moral and mental advancements. On 
a straightforward reading of the passage it says instead that a person has a duty 
to engage in some line of conduct in the world as it is just if that conduct can 
‘rightfully’ be ‘exacted’ from her in the here and now.
But there is another problem with trying to read V14 in this idealized way. 
Mill had a model for what people with highly cultivated natures, the sort who 
no longer needed anything resembling our customary morality, would be like: 
his eventual wife, Harriet Taylor Mill. In an essay on marriage written expressly 
for her consumption, Mill describes how a society of people with higher natures 
like hers would order their behavior.
By following their own impulses under the guidance of their own judgment, they 
would find more happiness, and would confer more, than by obeying any moral 
principles or maxims whatever: since these cannot possibly be adapted before-
hand to every peculiarity of circumstance which can be taken into account by a 
sound and vigorous intellect worked by a strong will, and guided by what Carlyle 
calls ‘an open loving heart’. Where there exists a genuine and strong desire to 
do that which is most for the happiness of all, general rules are merely aids to 
prudence, in the choice of means; not peremptory obligations. (Mill [1832–3?] 
1984, 39)
While Crisp may be right to say that Mill hopes that someday it will be possible 
to trust people to work out how to maximize happiness without the need of 
a decision procedure, what this passage shows is that Mill does not conceive 
of such a state of society as one in which people internalize a single rule that 
requires them to maximize happiness. Rather they would internalize no rules at 
all, in Lyons’s sense of feeling guilty for violating the rules and blaming others 
who do so. There would be no need for coercive social rules backed by sanctions 
of either the internal or external variety, since people would spontaneously 
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follow ‘their own impulses under the guidance of their own judgment.’ Given 
V14 we would expect Mill to say just what he in fact does say about such a world, 
namely that in it there would be no need for ‘any moral principles or maxims 
whatever,’ including the act-utilitarian principle if this is understood as a moral 
rule: ‘morality would not exist at all as morality, since morality and inclination 
would agree.’ So if we try to give V14 an idealized reading, one according to 
which Mill believes that actions are wrong here and now if they are forbidden 
by the rules that the inhabitants of the genuinely civilized world for which he 
hopes would do best to internalize, then we are forced to draw the absurd 
conclusion that Mill does not believe that any actions are wrong here and now.6
So the view that Crisp assigns to Mill is internally inconsistent, inasmuch 
as it entails contradictory evaluations of the moral standings of some actions, 
and its incoherence is fairly obvious. We might say on this basis that this view 
is inconsistent with V14. Even if we do not say this, however, we must at the 
very least say that considerations of charity militate strongly against embracing 
Crisp’s reading.
4. Brink
From Crisp I will turn now to Brink. Brink too accepts much of Lyons’s reading 
of V14, agreeing that Mill is here offering an analysis of what it means for an 
action to be wrong in terms of the justifiability of punishment or sanction. They 
differ on two points, though, only one of which Brink acknowledges. The explicit 
disagreement is with Lyons’s claim that Mill takes sanctions to ‘assume coercive 
rules.’ Brink writes that he sees ‘no evidence that Mill wants to introduce rules 
or principles into his formulation of the utilitarian standard’ (2013, 102). The 
implicit disagreement concerns Lyons’s assertion that Mill’s analysis in V14 is 
framed specifically in terms of the internal sanction. Brink writes as if he and 
Lyons agree that according to Mill in chapter V of Utilitarianism an action is 
wrong if any sort of sanction is warranted for it.
Brink further agrees with Lyons that, in chapter V of Utilitarianism, Mill intends 
for a utilitarian criterion to be used to judge when a punishment is warranted. 
He therefore labels the moral theory that Mill propounds in this chapter ‘sanc-
tion utilitarianism.’ And ‘Because sanction utilitarianism is a species of indirect 
utilitarianism,’ he writes, ‘it is inconsistent with act utilitarianism’ (2013, 101). 
There’s no reason to think that it will be optimal for agents to be punished if 
and only if they have performed a suboptimal action. Yet because Brink takes 
the rest of Mill’s corpus to offer abundant evidence that he subscribes to act 
utilitarianism – the passages that Brink adduces include but are not limited to 
II2 – he concludes that there is an ‘ambivalence’ at the heart of Mill’s under-
standing of morality. Even within Utilitarianism itself, Brink’s Mill puts forward 
two inconsistent utilitarian moral theories.
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It may not seem appropriate to number Brink among Mill’s act-utilitarian 
interpreters, since this is only one of the theories that he attributes to Mill. But 
Brink is clear that he regards act utilitarianism as Mill’s considered view and 
sanction utilitarianism as an ill-considered afterthought. Brink’s claim that act 
utilitarianism is Mill’s considered view hangs in part on his belief that sanction 
utilitarianism is a thoroughly unattractive theory, so that it would be unchari-
table to suppose that Mill’s commitment to it is deep. Brink says that sanction 
utilitarianism both fails to offer the advantage over act utilitarianism that it 
might at first glance seem to and that it suffers from some serious defects. 
The advantage that the theory might seem to have is that it can account for 
the existence not only of morally obligatory and morally wrong actions but 
also of actions that are morally permissible without being morally required and 
of supererogatory actions. An action is permissible for a sanction utilitarian if 
neither its performance nor its omission are optimally blamed; it is supererog-
atory if it is permissible and its consequences are sufficiently good (2013, 104). 
(For ‘blame’ here understand ‘performing’ or expressing blame, e.g. imposing 
at least informal external sanctions, as opposed merely to taking an attitude of 
blame.) Brink does not deny that sanction utilitarianism can account for these 
four distinct moral standings, but he asserts that act utilitarianism can do so as 
well, or at least that it can offer what he calls a ‘pragmatic reconstruction’ of this 
fourfold distinction (2013, 105). Specifically, the act utilitarian can distinguish 
between actions that it is optimal to blame agents for performing, actions that 
it is not optimal to blame agents for performing, actions that it is optimal to 
blame agents for omitting, and actions that it is not optimal to blame agents 
for omitting but is optimal to praise them for performing. Brink takes the fact 
that act utilitarians can assign some actions to this last category, for instance, to 
show that the theory can adequately account for our commonsense conviction 
that some actions go beyond the call of moral duty.
One of the defects that Brink finds in sanction utilitarianism is that it suffers 
from a version of what has come to be known as the ‘wrong kind of reason’ 
problem. More specifically, Brink alleges, sanction utilitarianism offers the wrong 
kind of reason for why someone should be punished. According to this theory, 
Brink says, an action is wrong in virtue of the justifiability of a sanction for it 
rather than the reverse. This, he observes, ‘inverts what many would regard as the 
usual dependency between wrongness and sanction’ (2013, 107). In other words, 
commonsense or customary morality is retributivist. Of course, act utilitarians 
reject this dependency altogether – they are the paradigmatic non-retributiv-
ists – but Brink remarks that at least the act utilitarian and retributivist ‘agree 
on the need for an account of an action’s wrongness that is independent of its 
suitability for sanction.’
The other defect is due to what Brink calls sanction utilitarianism’s ‘hybrid 
structure.’ Sanction utilitarianism offers an indirect utilitarian standard for judg-
ing whether actions are right or wrong; they are wrong if it would be optimal 
®
 
684   D. E. MILLER
to sanction them. Yet, Brink says, ‘imposing sanctions is itself a kind of action, 
and we can ask whether the imposition of a particular sanction would be right 
or wrong’ (2013, 108). But this, Brink continues, implies that for this one specific 
kind of action the sanction utilitarian is committed to employing both a direct 
utilitarian standard – imposing the sanction is wrong just if imposing it would 
not be optimal – and an indirect utilitarian standard – imposing the sanction is 
wrong just if punishing someone for imposing it would be optimal. But these 
standards will sometimes, perhaps often, lead to different answers, so sanction 
utilitarianism is inconsistent.
No work is needed to show that Brink’s interpretation attributes an unap-
pealing position, or rather an unappealing combination of positions, to Mill; the 
claim that Mill advocates two plainly inconsistent moral theories even within 
one essay is pretty damning. I hasten to add here that Brink is by no means an 
uncharitable reader of Mill; he reaches his conclusion that Mill’s utilitarianism is 
‘ambivalent’ with reluctance, not glee. He contends, however, that the evidence 
that Mill subscribes to act utilitarianism provided by passages other than V14 
is even more compelling than the convincing evidence that V14 provides for 
his sanction utilitarianism, so that this conclusion is regrettably forced upon us. 
And of course he takes the same evidence to support his claim that Mill is more 
committed to act than to sanction utilitarianism.
I agree with Brink that in V14 Mill’s advocating a sanction utilitarianism that 
is inconsistent with act utilitarianism. I disagree about whether the available 
textual evidence requires us to read Mill as an ambivalent utilitarian who is most 
strongly committed to act utilitarianism, but challenging Brink on this point 
would require detailed discussion of a number of passages scattered throughout 
Mill’s corpus; this would take me far beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
So my criticism of Brink’s reading here will be limited to a brief rejoinder to his 
negative assessment of sanction utilitarianism. If I can show that Brink is too 
hasty in writing this view off as far less attractive than act utilitarianism then this 
will go some distance toward showing that he is also too hasty in concluding 
that act utilitarianism is Mill’s considered view, even if he is right about Mill’s 
ambivalence.
Recall that Brink both overlooks Lyons’s interpretative claim that Mill intends 
to frame his analysis of what it means to call an action wrong in terms of the 
justifiability of the internal sanction specifically and challenges Lyons’s claim 
that for Mill the justifiability of individual applications of sanctions depends on 
the justifiability of coercive social rules. There is an important passage from a 
piece of correspondence that Mill penned in 1859 that I take to provide strong 
evidence both that Lyons’s claims are correct and that they are connected. (Note 
that Lyons himself doesn’t cite this letter.) Mill writes that:
Now as to the still more important subject of the meaning of ought. … I believe 
that the word has in some respects a different meaning to different people. We 
must first distinguish between those who have themselves a moral feeling – a 
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feeling of approving & condemning conscience, & those who have not, or in whom 
what they may have is dormant. I believe that those who have no feeling of right 
& wrong cannot possibly intue the rightness or wrongness of anything. They may 
assent to the proposition that a certain rule of conduct is right; but they really 
mean nothing except that such is the conduct which other people expect & require 
at their hands. … This you will probably agree with, & I will therefore pass to the 
case of those who have a true moral feeling, that is, a feeling of pain in the fact 
of violating a certain rule, quite independently of any expected consequences 
to themselves. It appears to me that to them the word ought means, that if they 
act otherwise, they shall be punished by this internal, & perfectly disinterested 
feeling. ([1859] 1972, 649)
In this letter, Mill is even more explicit than he is in V14 about offering an anal-
ysis that conceptually ties wrongness to the operation of the conscience. He is 
also explicit here that the conscience operates by enforcing internalized rules; 
the experience of guilt is an instance of ‘a feeling of pain in the fact of violat-
ing a certain rule.’ Admittedly, the specific account that Mill offers here is not 
precisely the analysis that he offers in V14; it explicates what it means to call 
an action wrong in terms of the speaker’s expectations about when she would 
experience guilt rather than in terms of her beliefs about when people should 
experience it. Certainly the account found in Utilitarianism is the more plausible 
of the two, but given that the letter was composed during the period in which 
Mill was drafting Utilitarianism; it is reasonable to read the essay in light of it 
and take the former to contain a revised version of what is found in the latter. 
So the specific version of sanction utilitarian that Mill puts forward in chapter 
V of Utilitarianism might accurately, if not elegantly, be called ‘rule-governed 
internal-sanction utilitarianism.’
Once we recognize that Mill understands what it is for an action to be wrong 
specifically in terms of the justifiability of the internal sanction, Brink’s hybrid 
structure objection to Mill’s sanction utilitarianism no longer goes through. 
The objection depends on the claim that, as Brink’s puts it, ‘imposing sanc-
tions is itself a kind of action.’ But, as Crisp recognizes, the internal sanction is 
different from legal or informal social sanctions in that its imposition does not 
require an action. So this objection cuts no ice against Mill’s version of sanction 
utilitarianism.
This leaves Brink’s ‘wrong kind of reason’ objection, to which I shall make 
two replies. First, the sort of sanction utilitarianism that Lyons finds in Mill is in 
fact not obviously vulnerable to the wrong kind of reason objection that Brink 
advances. The view that Lyons takes Mill to hold does not say that a particular 
action is wrong just if it would be optimal for the agent to feel guilty about it; 
it does not treat the consequences of her experiencing guilt as the right kind 
of reason for judging her to have acted wrongly. Utilitarian considerations only 
enter into the justification of the coercive social rules which distinguish right 
from wrong actions. When it comes to judgments about particular actions and 
agents, the view regards the wrongness of an action – its contravention of a 
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justified rule – as the right reason to sanction the agent, so the usual depend-
ency is maintained. The criminal law provides a useful analogy here. The com-
monsense view is that the fact that the consequences of sending an individual 
to jail would on balance be desirable is the wrong kind of reason for doing so. 
The right kind of reason is that she has been found guilty of violating a criminal 
law for which the penalty is incarceration.7 But there is no comparable com-
monsense consensus that legislators should not rely on cost-benefit analyses in 
deciding what behaviors to criminalize. Most people, I think, would say that the 
consequences of proposed laws are at least among the right kinds of reasons for 
legislators to attend to, and some – perhaps even many – might say that they 
are the only relevant considerations.8
Second, there is a moral theory that is obviously at odds with commonsense 
morality’s views about the right kinds of reasons for punishment, and it is act 
utilitarianism. So given Brink’s assumption that conventional morality correctly 
captures the right kind of reason for punishment, act utilitarianism must justify 
punishment by appeal to a reason of the wrong sort. Nothing could make this 
clearer than Brink’s own pragmatic reconstruction of the familiar fourfold dis-
tinction between moral standings found in commonsense morality. Although 
Brink assumes that it will be ‘typically’ be optimal to blame agents only for 
actions that were egregiously suboptimal, and so wrong in act-utilitarian terms, 
he does not and cannot assert that this will always be the case (2013, 105). 
(He acknowledges that some actions that it will be optimal to praise will actu-
ally be actions that were suboptimal, i.e. wrong in act utilitarian terms.) Brink’s 
proposed reconstruction thus highlights the fact that for act utilitarians the 
answer to the question of whether we should blame (i.e. punish) someone is 
only contingently connected to the moral standing of whatever it is that we 
would be blaming her for. But this flies in the face of, if it does not invert, ‘what 
many would regard as the usual dependency between wrongness and sanction,’ 
since it denies that the justifiability of sanctions depends upon the wrongness 
of the conduct. For the act utilitarian, the fact that the consequences of, for 
instance, sending a person to jail would on balance be desirable is precisely the 
right kind of reason to incarcerate her, which is why one longstanding objec-
tion to act utilitarianism is that it can require punishing the innocent. Sanction 
utilitarianism seems if anything to be closer to commonsense morality in this 
regard than is act utilitarianism; at least sanction utilitarianism and common-
sense morality agree there is some conceptual connection between an action’s 
suitability for sanction and its wrongness. Of course, an act utilitarian will rightly 
say that simply to assume that conventional morality accurately captures the 
right kind of reason for punishment begs the question against her theory. I 
do not mean to endorse this assumption. My point is only that when Brink 
endorses it, in the course of arguing that Mill would do better to reject sanction 
utilitarianism and become an act utilitarian simpliciter, he weakens rather than 
strengthens his own case.9
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So even if we accept that Brink’s pragmatic reconstruction suffices to show 
that act utilitarianism can account for our familiar variety of moral standings as 
well as sanction utilitarianism can, making the theories equally attractive in that 
regard, it remains the case that neither of Brink’s objections to sanction utili-
tarianism gives us any reason to reject the theory. One of the objections – that 
the theory fails to honor commonsense morality’s notions about what counts 
as the right kind of reason for punishing someone – seems to have more force 
against act than (the relevant version of ) sanction utilitarianism, if it has any 
force at all. So it appears that if we must regard Mill as an ambivalent utilitarian 
then it would be kinder to his reputation for us to take his considered view to be 
sanction utilitarianism, if the text could possibly permit this. And if Brink should 
turn out to be so far wrong about the text that it is possible for us to regard Mill 
as a thoroughgoing sanction utilitarian, then this would be kinder still.
5. Turner
In company with Crisp, Turner reads Mill as a consistent or ‘unambivalent’ act 
utilitarian. In company with both Crisp and Brink, Turner maintains that Mill’s 
act utilitarianism is of the sophisticated variety that distinguishes between the 
act-utilitarian moral standard and the decision procedure that theory recom-
mends to agents. But Turner’s approach to V14 is novel.
According to Turner, Mill assigns different meanings at different times to 
the word ‘morality’ itself and to moral terms such as ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ and it 
is only from context that we can judge which set of meanings to attach to the 
language in a given passage. Sometimes when Mill talks about morality he is 
talking about what is ultimately or fundamentally choiceworthy, by which I 
take Turner to mean what we have the most reason to do all things considered 
(2015, 723–724). When Mill is using moral language in this sense, right actions 
are choiceworthy and wrong ones are not. At other times, though, Mill uses the 
word ‘morality’ to refer to blameworthiness, and when he is speaking in this way, 
right actions are not blameworthy and wrong ones are. So rather than depicting 
Mill’s views as substantively inconsistent, as does Brink, Turner maintains that 
apparent substantive inconsistencies can be explained away as inconsistencies 
in Mill’s manner of speaking. For Turner Mill is not an ambivalent utilitarian so 
much as an ambiguous one, we might say, or at least one who does not explicitly 
disambiguate key terms. That is a less damning charge against Mill as a thinker; 
indeed, it may not be damning at all as long as there is some principle that 
guides Mill’s use of terminology and he avoids equivocating.
On Turner’s reading, act utilitarianism is Mill’s theory of morality in the sense 
of choiceworthiness, and Mill’s using moral language in this sense in passages 
that lend themselves to an act-utilitarian interpretation such as II2. In at least 
some passages that do not lend themselves to an act-utilitarian reading, how-
ever, Turner contends that Mill has shifted his meaning, so that he is actually 
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referring to blameworthiness rather than choiceworthiness (2015, 737–741). 
This is true of V14 in particular, and also of Mill’s discussion in the System of Logic 
of the Art of Life’s ‘department’ of ‘Morality’ ([1843] 1974, 949–950). So Turner 
agrees with Lyons inasmuch as he takes V14 to offer an analysis of one sense 
of ‘morally wrong action.’
But how are these two senses of ‘morality’ related? According to Turner, moral-
ity in the sense of blameworthiness ‘is best understood as evaluating actions 
in terms of whether a person has failed to do what is reasonably expected of 
him given epistemic and other limitations, and this evaluation accounts for the 
appropriateness of holding that person accountable’ (2015, 740). An action for 
which an individual is blameworthy is one ‘with regard to which the individual 
would have no right to complain if he were punished for performing it, because 
he had failed to do what others would reasonably expect him to do. It is in this 
sense that he is blameworthy.’ Turner acknowledges that Mill believes that for 
beings like us following the best available decision procedure will largely be a 
matter of complying with a set of rules, although he denies that this will always 
be the case; according to Mill, on Turner’s reading, ‘an agent may be blamewor-
thy for not violating a rule,’ any rule, when she could reasonably be expected 
to know that doing so would yield a better outcome (2015, 741). Even when 
it comes to self-blame, via the conscience, Turner doubts that the violation of 
some ideal rule is necessary and sufficient for punishment to be warranted. 
This doubt stems at least in part from doubt about whether Mill’s regards the 
operation of the conscience to be entirely governed by internalized rules, the 
letter to Ward notwithstanding; Turner suggests that ‘Mill takes conscience to 
be sensitive enough to track obvious exceptions to general rules’ (2015, 743).
Turner’s reading of Mill is insightful and inventive, but it is not unproblematic. 
Note first that on straightforward textual grounds it may not be consistent with 
V14. It is essential to Turner’s reading that Mill sometimes talks about actions 
being morally wrong without this connoting that punishing the agent would be 
justified, namely when he uses ‘wrong’ to mean not choiceworthy. But in V14, Mill 
says explicitly that there is no such sense of ‘morally wrong’: ‘the idea of penal 
sanction … enters … into the conception … of any kind of wrong.’ Admittedly, 
this point may depend on a too-literal reading of this line, in which Mill is noting 
that the conceptual connection between wrongness and the justifiability of 
punishment does not hold only in the case of injustices. So I shall not put too 
much weight on it. But there is a second problem with Turner’s interpretation 
that I take to be far more damaging.
This is that on Turner’s reading Mill’s view contains an especially glaring and 
egregious example of the wrong kind of reason problem that I discussed in the 
previous section. Suppose the question arises of whether to punish someone 
by an external sanction. As Turner reads him, Mill must say that this course of 
action is choiceworthy – it is what we have the most reason to do, all things 
considered – just if it would be optimal. Whether the individual in question did 
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anything blameworthy – that is, whether she failed to do her duty in virtue of 
failing to live up to others’ reasonable expectations of her – is irrelevant. Not 
only is its being ‘appropriate’ to punish her not a necessary condition of her 
punishment’s being warranted, it is not even germane to the question.10 It is 
hard to know what to make of Turner’s use of ‘appropriate,’ divorced as it is from 
any connection to our reasons for action. For Turner’s Mill, after all, the only 
considerations that count as reasons in favor of punishing someone are the 
desirable consequences that this would have, if any; the only considerations 
that count as reasons against are the undesirable consequences. If you are a 
thoroughgoing act utilitarian, one who says that punishment is warranted just 
if it will be optimal, then when people protest that this is the wrong kind of 
reason for punishment at least you can accuse them of begging the question 
against you, as already noted. But if you adopt an account of when punishment 
is warranted according to which this depends on what the agent did in the past, 
then the fact that punishing her would produce better future consequences is 
the wrong kind of reason for punishment by your own lights.
We should demand very strong textual evidence before concluding that this 
is Mill’s position. And in fact the text, or at least V14 itself, seems to tell in the 
other direction; the clear implication of V14 seems to be that an individual who 
is not blameworthy would be entitled to complain about being subjected to 
punishment. It would be quite surprising for Mill to believe that punishing her 
over her justified complaint could nonetheless be choiceworthy – and stranger 
still for him to believe that the fact that her complaint is justified does not even 
count against its choiceworthiness.
6. Conclusion
Clearly my conclusion is that none of Mill’s act-utilitarian interpreters have as 
yet found a compelling way of coming to terms with Utilitarianism V14. As I 
conceded at my commencement, this alone is not enough to let anyone draw 
the further conclusion that the act-utilitarian interpretation ought to be rejected. 
Despite its importance, V14 is just one of many stretches of text that bear on the 
debate how we should answer the question of what moral theory Mill holds. 
Apart from II2 I have said nothing about the passages that may seem to favor 
the act-utilitarian interpretation, and there are several. The lines which do this 
most clearly might be these from ‘Taylor’s Statesman’:
The evil of departing from a well-known and salutary rule is indeed one momen-
tous item on that side of the account; but to treat it as equal to infinity, and as 
necessarily superseding the measurement of any finite quantities of evil on the 
opposite side, appears to us to be the most fatal of all mistakes in ethical theory. 
(Mill and George [1837] 1977, 638)
There is also a letter to John Venn, in which Mill writes that ‘I agree with you 
that the right way of testing actions by their consequences, is to test them by 
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the natural consequences of the particular action’ (Mill [1872] 1972, 1881). And 
there are more.
Now of course those who dislike the act-utilitarian reading have ways of 
explaining away these passages. II2, for instance, seems if anything to express 
a scalar view that is rather different from what is today considered standard act 
utilitarianism (cf. Crisp 1997, 96–97). ‘Taylor’s Statesman’ is a very early ([1837] 
1977) essay co-authored with George Grote, one that even the editor of Mill’s 
Collected Works relegates to an appendix, so the line that I quoted from it may 
not represent Mill’s position, let alone his considered and mature view. The Venn 
letter may be more relevant to Mill’s views on prudential than moral evaluation.11 
But we kid ourselves if we are entirely satisfied with these explanations. As I 
said at the outset, there is little prospect of our ever finding a moral theory that 
is both very plausible in its own right and a perfect fit with all of Mill’s ethical 
writings. But while there may be no reading of Mill’s moral theory on which we 
can rest in complete comfort, V14 remains an especially sharp thorn in the side 
of those who settle on the act-utilitarian interpretation.
Notes
1.  Jacobson (2003) argues that Utilitarianism is intended as an ecumenical statement 
of doctrine that is common ground between utilitarians rather than a statement 
of Mill’s views specifically. He also (2008) argues for a novel interpretation of Mill’s 
utilitarianism according to which Mill does not believe that ‘purely self-regarding’ 
actions can be wrong, for reasons that are independent of any utility calculations, 
and V14 is an essential part of his argument. I do not mean to insinuate that there 
is any inconsistency between these articles. The earlier piece focuses on the first 
four chapters of Utilitarianism, but since we know that chapter V was composed 
apart from the rest of Utilitarianism it is entirely possible that it was written with 
a different purpose in view (see Robson 1969, cxxiii–cxxv).
2.  Lyons gives two reasons for declining to call Mill a rule utilitarian, neither of 
which is persuasive. One is that Mill takes the disutility of sanctions into account 
in determining which coercive social rules are justified; Lyons says that most 
rule utilitarians don’t take sanctions into account, but he never gives any reason 
why they could not, and indeed he acknowledges that at least one – Richard 
Brandt – does (1977, 122). The other is that Mill arrives at his view through, in 
part, ‘considering the logic of the central moral concepts’ ([1978] 1994, 79). Again, 
Lyons gives no reason why this should disqualify Mill from being a rule utilitarian. 
There may be instances in which it does make sense to take the patterns of 
reasoning that would lead someone to endorse moral theories into account when 
classifying them, rather than attending only to their standard for judging actions 
right or wrong. This would let us say that distinct theories are extensionally 
equivalent, as Lyons famously shows is true of ‘primitive’ rule utilitarianism and 
act utilitarianism (Lyons 1965, 119–135). But why Lyons should believe that 
the fact that Mill’s reasoning includes some analysis of moral concepts should 
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3.  Of course, this would not hold true if Crisp took Mill to be saying only that part 
of what we mean when we ‘call anything wrong’ is that it is justifiably punished. 
In other words, my objection assumes that in V14 Crisp takes Mill to be asserting 
the biconditional ‘An action is wrong if and only if is justifiably punished.’ If instead 
he takes him to assert only the conditional statement ‘If an action is wrong then 
it is justifiably punished.’, then my objection is inapplicable. The fact that Mill 
says in V14 that when we call an action wrong we ‘mean to imply’ that the agent 
should be punished might even seem to lend support to this weaker reading, 
since it might suggest that Mill does not take himself to be giving a full account 
of the meaning of ‘morally wrong action.’ However, there is nothing in Crisp’s 
text to suggest that he intends to claim that Mill asserts only the conditional 
statement in V14 and not the biconditional. On the contrary, he writes that Mill’s 
‘phrase “mean to imply” here is best taken as equivalent to “mean”, since in 5.14 
he explicitly says he is analysing the 'notions' of right and wrong … According 
to Mill, when one says that an action a is “wrong” one means that a ought to be 
punished by law, opinion or conscience’ (Crisp 1997, 128). Moreover, it would 
be difficult to reconcile this way of reading V14 with the text, Mill’s slack use of 
‘mean to imply’ notwithstanding, since at the end of the paragraph it becomes 
clear that he means to assert the biconditional: ‘we call any conduct wrong, or 
employ, instead, some other term of dislike or disparagement, according as we 
think that the person ought, or ought not, to be punished for it.’ I am indebted 
to Roger Crisp and Ben Eggleston for discussion on this point.
4.  We should not forget that Crisp’s Mill says that even now we should follow the 
act-utilitarian principle when the rules of customary morality conflict. But there 
is no reason to expect that every time a rule of customary morality forbids a 
maximizing action it will be in conflict with another rule of the same kind.
5.  I allude here to Mill’s use of ‘civilization’ in 1861, 231–233.
6.  It is also worth noting that a society in which the only rule that is widely 
internalized is the act-utilitarian principle is probably not one for which a 
utilitarian would wish. First, such a society might face the following unpleasant 
choice: either use draconian (i.e., severely painful) measures to make people 
experience compunction and blame strongly enough for them to be motivated 
to make the sacrifices that this principle requires or allow them to constantly 
experience some level of guilt for failing to live up to the principle. Second, it 
might be difficult for people who have internalized only this rule to coordinate 
their behavior, and so many benefits of social cooperation might be lost. How, 
for example, can I make plans based on your promise to assist me, if I know that 
when the time comes you will feel obligated to break your promise should this 
seem to you to be happiness-maximizing? (See Hodgson 1967, 38–50.) Of course, 
this second point may also raise a problem for Mill’s depiction of a ‘post-moral’ 
society in the ‘Marriage’ essay.
7.  We might think it is permissible for a judge not to jail a person who has broken 
such a law if the law permits some alternative punishment whose consequences 
would be better, of course.
8.  It is possible that the type of sanction utilitarianism that Lyons takes Mill to hold 
is open to some other, subtler wrong kind of reason objection. Stephen Darwall, 
for example, has argued that this is true of indirect rule-consequentialist theories, 
and he would certainly include the view that Lyons attributes to Mill within the 
scope of the objection. Note, though, that Darwall maintains that direct act-
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9.  An anonymous reviewer rightly notes that the view that Crisp attributes to 
Mill may also be vulnerable to a version of the wrong kind of reasons problem, 
although space did not permit me to explore this possibility.
10.  It is possible that the type of sanction utilitarianism that Lyons takes Mill to hold 
is open to some other, subtler wrong kind of reason objection. Stephen Darwall, 
for example, has argued that this is true of indirect rule-consequentialist theories, 
and he would certainly include the view that Lyons attributes to Mill within the 
scope of the objection. Note, though, that Darwall maintains that direct act-
consequentialist theories are equally vulnerable to the same objection (2006, 
103–104).
11.  Or so Ben Eggleston and I have argued (2008).
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